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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The rule has also been completely repudiated in Arkansas, Florida,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Tennessee
and Wisconsin in negligence cases.
Taking into consideration the current status of the rule in Okla-
homa, as well as its modification or complete repudiation in so many other
jurisdictions, it would not seem unreasonable to say the prognosis is
indeed grave as to the continuation of privity as a recognized element
necessary to recovery for product-caused injuries in Oklahoma.
Jack Maner
TORTS: DEFAMING A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
"(I)t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although
not always with perfect taste, on all public institutions."' With this
statement from one of its earlier decisions, the United States Supreme
Court, in the recent case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 Sup.Ct.
710 (1964), struck down libel actions brought by public servants based
on good faith criticism of their official conduct. The Court felt that to
allow the sword of civil libel judgments, resulting from nonmalicious,
though sometimes false, criticism of public officials to hang over the
head of the governed flaunts the constitutional guarantee of free speech
on all matters of public concern. Mt. Justice Brennan, in writing for
the majority summarized the decision when he wrote:
... the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression requires,
we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from re-
covering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual
malice - that is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not?
The action was initiated in Alabama upon the allegations of the
plaintiff Sullivan that he had been libeled by statements in a fall page
advertisement which was carried in the New York Times on March 29,
1960.? The advertisement reflected the attempts of the Montgomery
police to thwart the Negro struggle through brutality and harrassment.
None of the statements in the advertisement referred directly to Sullivan,
either by name or official capacity, but it was his contention that the
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo.App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Brown v.
Globe Laboratories, 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 75 A.I.P-2d 1 (1961);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191
N.E.2d 81 (1963); Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8
(1953); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa.Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959);
General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn.App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
2For collection of cases see 74 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1191 (1960 § 22).
1 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270.
2 84 Sup.Ct. at 726.3Id. at 740.
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frequent reference to the activities of the police was an attack upon him
as Police Commissioner. Sullivan and six other Montgomery citizens
testified that they read some or all of the statements as referring to him
in his capacity as Commissioner.
It was established at the trial, and uncontroverted, that several of
the statements of fact contained in the advertisement were untrue and
not accurate description of events which occurred in Montgomery. The
manager of the Times' Advertising Acceptability Department testified
that he had approved the advertisement for publication because he knew
nothing to cause him to believe that anything in it was false and because
it bore the endorsement of a number of people who were well known
and whose reputations he had no reason to question. Neither he nor
anyone else at the Times made any effort to confirm the accuracy of
the advertisement. The jury awarded plaintiff damages of five hundred
thousand dollars and the Supreme Court of Alabama, in affirming the
lower court, pointed out that the words were libelous per se and that
the first amendment of the United States Constitution does not protect
libelous publications.'
Because of what the U.S. Supreme Court termed "important con-
stitutional issues,; certiorari was granted.' The question to be decided
upon review was whether the rule of liability, as applied by the Alabama
Court, in an action brought by a public official against good faith critics
of his conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and press that is guaranteed
by the first and fourteenth amendments.
An examination of American case law on this subject discloses that
the overwhelming majority of decisions are based on two earlier cases,
Post Publishing Co. v,. Hallam," and Coleman v. MacLennan.7
The Post Publishing case, or the so-called majority opinion case,
evidences the rule that fair comment and criticism of the acts and conduct
of a public officer, or candidate for public office, are, in the absence of
malice, privileged. But the privilege does not exist where false statements
of fact have been uttered. This case involved false statements which had
been published about plaintiff, a senatorial candidate, and Judge Taft, in
referring to defendant's plea of privilege, stated: ". . . if the privilege is to
extend to cases... (involving false statements of fact) ... then a man who
offers himself as a candidate must submit uncomplainingly to the loss
of his reputation . . . if only his accuser honestly believes the charge
upon reasonableg rounds."'
The minority, or liberal view, which was adopted by the majority
of the Court in the main case, is based on the Coleman case. That con-
troversy arose from an article published in the defendant newspaper
which falsely accused the plaintiff, the Attorney General of Kansas,
of official misconduct in connection with a school fund transaction.
The Kansas Supreme Court felt that the public good to be derived
from open debate of all public issues so overshadowed the chance of
4New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25 (1962).
5 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 371 U.S. 946 (1963).6 59 Fed. 530 (6th Cir. 1893).
7 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
8 59 Fed. at 540.
(Vol. 2, No. I
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
injury to private reputation that the following rule was formulated: "If
the occasion be absolutely privileged, there can be no recovery. If it be
conditionally privileged, the plaintiff must prove malice, actual evil-
mindedness, or fail."9 Actually, the theory behind this rule was more
aptly put in the case of Friedell v. Blakely Printig Co.," where the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in adopting the rule formulated in the
Coleman case, said:
The benefit of the liberty of the press is a myth, if dishonesty or
questionable loyalty of candidates for office must be handled with
delicacy and discussed with such choice words as to make it appear
that the publicity is a matter of indifference."
In defending the appeal in the main case respondent Sullivan
directed the Court's attention to its own prior decisions to the effect that
punishment for libel never has been thought to raise any constitutional
questions or problems.2 In taking notice of the respondent's argument the
Court acknowledged the cited cases as being the law but was quick
to distinguish them on the basis that none of the decisions pointed out
dealt with defamation of public officials. The only case in which the
Court has been faced with the problems of libel and the public servant
is the case of Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney." Factually
this case was very similar to Sullivan, in that it was an action brought
by a Congressman who had been falsely accused of "anti-semitism." The
trial court awarded Sweeney damages and the Circuit Court upheld the
award. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision but was divided on the
constitutional question and it was left undecided. Thus by placing its
prior libel decisions, those not involving public servants, beyond the
scope of the question at hand, the Court denied libel actions immunity
from the Constitutional standards of the First Amendment. The slate was
clean; the rule of the land yet to be written.
The victor, "the unfettered exchange of ideas," was evident at the
outset as the Court unfolded an impressive array of history and precedent
marshalled from the ranks of its own prior decisions and treatises by
Constitutional authorities. The cases cited do not deal with the issue at
hand but rather with a variety of subjects touching the first amendment
and exemplifying what the Court called its "background of profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . ."" The defamer now stands
protected by the armor of privilege, vulnerable only to his own malicious
intent. The public servant stands armed with only an ambiguious defini-
tion of malice . . . "that is with knowledge it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."15
With the law settled and the Constitution satisfied, the Court wasted
9 98 P. 281, 292.
10163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974, (1925).11203 N.W. at 975.
i Tin .Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), Beauharnias v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
"3316 U.S. 642, affirming 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cit. 1941).
14 84 Sup.Ct. at 721.
1S Id. at 726.
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little time in disposing of the case after a review of the facts. The Times
had acted in good faith and its failure to determine the validity of the
statements, relying instead on the good reputation of those submitting
the advertisement, would not justify a holding that the Times had acted
with reckless disregard concerning the truthfulness of the statements.
In view of the Court's decision in the present case the only key
which will now open the closed door is for the defamed public servant to
allege and prove "actual malice." With the requirement of proving
actual malice one must now distinguish this from the presumption of
malice which arises as a matter of law from the publication of defamatory
words which are libelous per se.' The Court made it clear that malice
which flows from a statutory presumption does not meet the requisite
constitutional standards and that the power to create presumptions is
not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.
The standard which is thus set is at best ambiguous, and only time
and litigation can test its scope. Prior decisions reflect that evidence
pointing to actual malice in libel actions falls into four categories: that
the language used exceeded the necessity of the occassion, such as the use
of gross sarcasm;" that the publisher acted with a motive not contemplated
by the privilege, for instance being motivated by "racial prejudice"1" or
"personal contempt"; 9 that the publisher knew the statements to be false
at the time of publication," or had no reasonable grounds upon which
to base a belief in the truth of the statements, as where rumors are
published;" or that the publisher relied on the reputation of another for
truth and veracity.
It is in this fourth category that Justice Brennan's "reckless disregard"
should be placed. To be noted, however, is that the Court's findings and
decision in the main case- that the Times was justified in relying on
the reputation of those submitting the advertisement and that the Times'
failure to authenticate or verify the statements fell short of evidencing
malice may be the conception of a new breed of malice, germane only
to this class of libel actions. It would fit into the spectrum somewhere
beyond gross negligence but short of intentional. Whether or not this be
the answer will be left to future litigation, but it is doubtful that the
Court would put a plaintiff's only key so far beyond reach as to promote
bad faith journalism.
While the far reaching implications of this decision will not be
ascertainable for some time to come the popular belief about this much-
heralded case is that "libel in good faith" has become the password. This
idea is based on pure conjecture and is dependent on the weight and
sufficiency of evidence which will be required to meet the requisite of
proving actual malice. If the effect of the decision is to minimize the
available competent evidence and to increase the required sufficiency, libel
16 Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (3rd ed. 1964).
"7Hogan v. New York Times Co., 211 F.Supp. 99 (Conn. 1962).8 State Press Inc. v. Willat, 245 S.W.2d 403 (Ark. 1952).
9 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 206 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1953).
"Lawless v. Muller, 99 N.J.L. 9, 123 Ad. 104 (1923).21 Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922).
2 Wood v. Constitution Pub. Co., 57 Ga.App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937).
(Vol 2, No. I
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